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INTRODUCTION 
Whether it was O.J. Simpson, Casey Anthony, or Scott Peter-
son, history has shown that Americans love an exciting criminal 
trial.1 As a result, in the United States, the coverage and analysis of 
high-publicity criminal cases is ever-growing, creating many oppor-
tunities for attorneys to work in media as legal commentators.2 The 
term “legal commentator” has no precise definition, but generally 
entails attorneys making statements in the media that contain legal 
analysis.3 When attorneys speak in the media they simultaneously 
act in two roles: as a licensed attorney who has professional respon-
sibilities and as a journalist who must meet viewership require-
ments. These two different roles can have countervailing interests 
                                                                                                                            
1 See Sarah K. Fleisch, The Ethics of Legal Commentary: A Reconsideration of the Need for 
an Ethical Code in Light of the Duke Lacrosse Matter, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 599, 599 
(2007). 
2 See id. 
3 See infra Part II.A. 
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and values. The legal profession may demand that an attorney’s 
speech educate the public and promote respect for the judicial sys-
tem, while the media may demand easily digestible soundbites that 
boost ratings.4 In this media context, the legal profession must con-
sider how to best ensure that attorneys provide ethical legal com-
mentary regarding the criminal justice system.5 
To better demonstrate how a legal commentator can face the 
temptation to provide style over substance at the expense of the 
legal system, consider the example of Wendy Murphy.6 Murphy, a 
former prosecutor and adjunct professor at New England School of 
Law, became a prolific presence on television talk shows during the 
prosecution of multiple Duke University lacrosse players for an 
alleged rape.7 Throughout the case, Murphy provided outrageous 
commentary that was strongly slanted toward the prosecution.8 For 
example, over the course of several different guest appearances, 
Murphy referred to the defendants as rapists; speculated, without 
evidence, that one or more of the defendants had been molested as 
a child; and dismissed evidence that the defendants had good dis-
ciplinary records at school by responding that “Hitler never beat 
his wife either . . . So what?”9 Furthermore, Murphy even ques-
tioned the presumption of innocence (one of the most important 
tenets of U.S. criminal law10) by stating, “I’m really tired of people 
suggesting that you’re somehow un-American if you don’t respect 
the presumption of innocence because you know what that sounds 
                                                                                                                            
4 See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Fair Trial and Pub. Discourse § 8-2.4 (2013) 
[hereinafter 2013 Standards]; Erwin Chemerinsky & Laurie Levenson, The Ethics of Being 
A Commentator, 69 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1303, 1313 (1996) [hereinafter Ethics I]. 
5 This Note will only study the application of ethical standards to legal commentators 
providing analysis on criminal law issues and will not consider whether ethical standards 
should be adopted in a civil context as well. 
6 See STUART TAYLOR, JR. & KC JOHNSON, UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT: POLITICAL 
CORRECTNESS AND THE SHAMEFUL INJUSTICES OF THE DUKE LACROSSE CASE 144 (2007). 
7 The Duke lacrosse rape case involved a criminal case brought in 2006 against three 
Duke lacrosse students that created a media frenzy until the charges were dismissed. See 
Fleisch, supra note 1; see also TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 6. 
8 See TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 164–65. 
9 Id. at 165–66. 
10 See Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789–90 (1979) (quoting Coffin v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)) (“The principle that there is a presumption of 
innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its 
enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”). 
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like to a victim? Presumption you’re a liar.”11 By providing head-
line-worthy but legally-deficient commentary, Murphy’s behavior 
epitomizes why the legal profession needs to confront the ethical 
issues that attorneys face when speaking in the media. 
The American Bar Association (“ABA”) addressed the issue 
of legal commentary ethics in 2013 when it adopted its first-ever 
criminal justice ethical standards for legal commentators (the 
“2013 Standards”).12 The 2013 Standards provide ethical guidance 
to legal commentators by explaining how a commentator can be-
come competent to provide commentary on a given case, what con-
flicts a commentator should disclose, and what types of comments 
a commentator should avoid making. However, the 2013 Standards 
do not go far enough and could benefit from certain clarifications. 
First, the 2013 Standards do not define “legal commentator,” leav-
ing room for interpretation as to what types of attorneys qualify as 
commentators.13 Second, the 2013 Standards limit what statements 
qualify as commentary, excluding certain types of statements that 
could nevertheless cause harm to individuals, the public, and the 
legal system generally.14 Third, the 2013 Standards do not encour-
age commentators to avoid inflicting unnecessary reputational 
harm on individuals involved in criminal litigation (such as defen-
dants or subjects of investigation), despite the great damage that 
such commentary can cause.15 
Voluntary standards should broadly construe who qualifies as a 
legal commentator and what qualifies as legal commentary, and 
such standards should address the dangers of unnecessary reputa-
tional harm caused by legal commentary. Part I of this Note will 
explore the media’s impact on the criminal justice system, explain 
what makes legal commentators different from other journalists, 
and discuss the history of regulation of legal commentators. Part II 
will discuss how voluntary codes have, and have not, addressed 
who qualifies as legal commentators, what qualifies as legal com-
mentary, and what should be done about the risks of causing unne-
                                                                                                                            
11 TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 166. 
12 See generally 2013 Standards, supra note 4, § 8-2.4. 
13 See generally id. 
14 See infra Part II.B. 
15 See infra Part II.C. 
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cessary reputational harm. Part III will explain why expanding the 
reach of voluntary standards is important. It will propose that the 
ABA apply its new ethical standards for legal commentators more 
broadly by adding an inclusive definition of legal commentator and 
applying the standards to all legal analysis provided by a commen-
tator. Part III will also suggest that voluntary standards should en-
courage commentators to avoid causing reputational harm when 
their commentary has no countervailing educational purpose, and 
that the ABA add such language to its standards. Part IV con-
cludes. 
I. A BACKGROUND ON LEGAL COMMENTARY 
Legal commentators have a distinct and important role in the 
media’s coverage of the criminal justice system. As licensed attor-
neys, legal commentators must follow mandatory ethical codes, 
regardless of whether they actively practice law, because each 
state’s judicial branch or bar association regulates attorneys and 
enforces professional discipline for violating codes.16 Journalists, on 
the other hand, operate under voluntary codes of ethics with no 
disciplinary authority.17 To properly understand why legal com-
mentators should be held to ethical standards beyond the require-
ments of non-attorneys in the media, one must understand the me-
dia’s impact on the criminal justice system; why legal commenta-
tors differ from other journalists;18 and what efforts have been 
made to regulate commentators. 
                                                                                                                            
16 See Ethics I, supra note 4, at 1314; Judith L. Maute, Bar Associations, Self-Regulation 
and Consumer Protection: Whither Thou Goest?, 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 53, 58 (2008). Each 
state develops its own ethical codes, but the ABA drafts model codes that many states 
adopt. See Maute, supra. 
17 See Ethics I, supra note 4, at 1314. However, media outlets may enforce their own 
employment standards to encourage ethical journalism, such as when NBC suspended 
news anchor Brian Williams for making a misrepresentation in an NBC broadcast. See 
Emily Steel & Ravi Somaiya, Brian Williams Suspended from NBC for 6 Months Without 
Pay, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/11/business/ 
media/brian-williams-suspended-by-nbc-news-for-six-months.html 
[http://perma.cc/N8LK-5PED]. 
18 As stated above, journalists have their own ethical guidelines; however, their 
standards do not address many of the issues faced exclusively by legal commentators. See 
SPJ Code of Ethics, SOC’Y OF PROF. JOURNALISTS, http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp 
[http://perma.cc/7GXT-ATRY] (last updated Sept. 6, 2014) (discussing four principles 
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A. Examples of the Media’s Impact on the Criminal Justice System 
The media’s coverage of high publicity trials can have a great 
impact on the administration of justice. For instance, trial publicity 
can impact the impartiality of a jury pool by exposing potential ju-
rors to a great amount of pretrial knowledge on the case.19 Media 
scrutiny can also pressure jurors to conform their verdict to public 
opinion rather than the evidence presented at trials and can even 
expose jurors to danger if they refuse to do so.20 One-sided media 
coverage can also convince the public that a specific verdict is in-
evitable, which can lead people to lose faith in the legal system 
when the media’s predictions are wrong.21 Finally, harsh media 
coverage can cause great reputational harm to defendants and oth-
ers involved in a criminal proceeding, which may continue to im-
pact such persons even if they are ultimately vindicated.22 This sec-
tion will briefly explore the impact that media can have on the legal 
system by looking at the media coverage of three high-publicity 
criminal cases: Sheppard v. Maxwell,23 the O.J. Simpson trial, and 
the Duke lacrosse rape case. 
Sheppard is the seminal case concerning criminal trial publicity. 
In 1954, Samuel Sheppard’s pregnant wife was brutally murdered 
in their home and Sheppard quickly became the prime suspect.24 
The case received overwhelming amounts of media publicity 
throughout the criminal investigation, prosecution, and eventual 
conviction of Sheppard.25 The United States Supreme Court, con-
                                                                                                                            
that are foundational for ethical journalism: (1) seek truth and report it; (2) minimize 
harm; (3) act independently; and (4) be accountable and transparent). 
19 Brian V. Breheny & Elizabeth M. Kelly, Maintaining Impartiality: Does Media 
Coverage of Trials Need to Be Curtailed?, 10 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 371, 382–83 
(1995). While judges may direct potential jurors to refrain from exposing themselves to 
outside information on a given case, such orders do not guarantee that jurors will actually 
avoid following the media coverage of a case. Id. at 391. 
20 Id. at 383. 
21 See Glenn Garvin, Casey Anthony Verdict Outrage: Critics Blame Nancy Grace, Geraldo 
Rivera and Other Media Figures, VANCOUVER SUN (July 7, 2011), http://archive.today/ 
4n0BO#selection-2587.0-2587.96 [http://perma.cc/8A83-WCRJ]. 
22 See TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 355 (“You can try to move on, but rape will 
always be associated with my name. ‘Innocent’ might be part of that, but when I die, 
they’ll say, ‘One of the three Duke lacrosse rape suspects died today.”). 
23 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). 
24 See id. at 335–36. 
25 See id. 
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sidering Sheppard’s habeas corpus application in 1966, recounted 
the many ways that the media invaded the entire criminal justice 
process. First, prior to the trial, the media spent months providing 
highly biased coverage of the case, consistently emphasizing incri-
minating evidence and highlighting discrepancies in Sheppard’s 
statements to authorities.26 The Court also found that members of 
the jury had undoubtedly heard this negative publicity during the 
trial and likely faced pressure from the community to find Shep-
pard guilty because newspapers had published pictures and the ad-
dresses of jury members.27 In addition, news reporters had a large 
and disruptive presence during the trial itself, as the judge permit-
ted the media to practically take over the courtroom.28 Lastly, 
throughout the trial, newspapers interpreted evidence and drew 
unwarranted inferences from testimony, which generally indicated 
to readers that Sheppard was guilty.29 The Supreme Court ulti-
mately held that the trial judge had failed to protect Sheppard from 
the inherently prejudicial publicity and failed to control disruptive 
influences in the courtroom, depriving Sheppard of his right to due 
process.30 
Nearly thirty years later, the O.J. Simpson trial became argua-
bly the most publicized case ever.31 Prior to Simpson’s arrest, his 
                                                                                                                            
26 See id. at 340. The media also deeply probed the investigation itself. For example, 
the coroner asked Sheppard to re-enact the events at his home and invited newspaper 
reporters along, who reported his performance and included photographs. See id. at 338. 
Sheppard was also interviewed three months before trial without counsel during a three-
day inquest that was televised live to hundreds of people. See id. at 354. 
27 See id. at 353, 357. 
28 See id. at 355. 
29 See id. at 357. As aptly summarized by the Ohio Supreme Court: 
Murder and mystery, society, sex and suspense were combined in this 
case in such a manner as to intrigue and captivate the public fancy to a 
degree perhaps unparalleled in recent annals. Throughout the 
preindictment investigation, the subsequent legal skirmishes and the 
nine-week trial, circulation-conscious editors catered to the insatiable 
interest of the American public in the bizarre . . . . In this atmosphere 
of a ‘Roman holiday’ for the news media, Sam Sheppard stood trial 
for his life. 
Id. at 356 (citing State v. Sheppard, 135 N.E.2d 340, 342 (Ohio 1956)). 
30 See id. at 363. 
31 See Ethics I, supra note 4, at 1303. 
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infamous “Bronco Chase” drew ninety-five million viewers.32 
When the jury reached a final verdict, more than 150 million people 
watched.33 From June 1994 to October 1995, the media analyzed, 
dissected, and televised nearly every aspect of the trial.34 The me-
dia also relied heavily on legal commentators to perform the analy-
sis, often asking them to score trial participants, provide predic-
tions, and release nonpublic information.35 At times, the media 
even relied on incompetent commentators.36 The media consis-
tently asserted that the jury could only possibly reach a guilty ver-
dict; thus, when Simpson was found not guilty, much of the Amer-
ican public, primarily divided on racial lines, believed that the jus-
tice system had failed.37 
More recently, in 2006, the media feverishly followed yet 
another high-profile criminal case in which members of the Duke 
University lacrosse team were charged with raping an exotic danc-
er.38 From the media’s perspective, the case had everything to cap-
tivate the public’s attention: a rape committed by “a swaggering 
pack of white, privileged beer-drinkers with a string of misdemea-
nor charges, and the accuser as a hard-working state college stu-
dent stripping to stay in school and support her two children.”39 
The case touched three major social fault lines: class, race, and 
sex.40 Almost immediately, the media presumed the Duke students 
guilty and filled the airwaves with constant one-sided coverage.41 
Eventually, it came to light that the prosecutor had committed se-
rious misconduct,42 leading to the dismissal of all charges against 
                                                                                                                            
32 Erwin Chemerinsky & Laurie Levenson, The Ethics of Being a Commentator III, 50 
MERCER L. REV. 737, 738 n.2 (1999) [hereinafter Ethics III]. 
33 Witness to History: The Role of Legal Commentators in High Profile Trials, 49 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 439, 441 (2001) [hereinafter Witness to History]. 
34 See Ethics I, supra note 4, at 1303, 1309–10, 1320, 1324. 
35 Id. at 1309–10, 1320, 1324. 
36 Id. 
37 See Witness to History, supra note 33, at 441; Trey Sanchez, Virtual Celebrity: 
The Right of Publicity and Video Games, TRUTH REVOLT (Nov. 25, 2014), 
http://www.truthrevolt.org/news/flashback-oj-simpson-verdict-reactions-no-justice-no-
rioting [http://perma.cc/2TLX-UYKJ]. 
38 See Fleisch, supra note 1, at 609. 
39 TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 123. 
40 See id. at 127. 
41 See id. at 122. 
42 See id. at 311–12, 317. 
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the students,43 as well as a statement from the North Carolina At-
torney General declaring that the students were innocent.44 How-
ever, even exoneration could not undo the harm the media inflicted 
on the students’ reputations.45 The Sheppard, Simpson, and Duke 
lacrosse cases are strong examples the media’s significant influence 
on criminal proceedings. These examples demonstrate how unethi-
cal media coverage can prejudice juries, make the public lose faith 
in the legal system, or permanently damage the reputation of inno-
cent defendants. 
B. What Makes Legal Commentators Different From Other 
Journalists 
Legal commentators are unique actors in the media because, 
unlike non-attorneys, commentators have a distinct responsibility 
to educate the public on the legal system and have enhanced credi-
bility in the eyes of the public. Due to legal commentators being 
regularly featured on twenty-four hour news channels such as 
CNN, MSNBC, and CSPAN, as well as network news programs 
on channels such as ABC, NBC, and CBS, their importance in the 
media has increased.46 In addition, networks such as the CNN-
owned HLN47 have legal news programs that rely on legal com-
mentators to discuss trending legal news stories.48 These shows 
can have wide viewership, as exemplified by the program Nancy 
Grace, which draws as many as three million viewers per show.49 
                                                                                                                            
43 See id. at 317. 
44 See id. at 350–51. 
45 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
46 See Fleisch, supra note 1, at 599. 
47 HLN’s website describes the network as “the national television network that 
focuses on the ‘must-see, must-share’ stories of the day. About HLN, HLN, 
http://www.hlntv.com/hln-about-us [http://perma.cc/MR8T-SQZ3] (last visited Sept. 
25, 2015). By “[d]rawing upon the network’s deep bench of talent, HLN dissects and 
demystifies the news stories and newsmakers people are talking about.” Id. 
48 David Carr, TV Justice Thrives on Fear, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/business/media/23carr.html 
[http://perma.cc/2STN-2P4Y]. 
49 Lisa de Moraes, “Nancy Grace” HLN, Score Ratings Coup with Casey Anthony 
Verdict, WASH. POST (July 6, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/ 
nancy-grace-hln-score-ratings-coup-with-casey-anthony-verdict/2011/07/06/gIQAmv2 
I1H_story.html [http://perma.cc/TR94-TE96] (discussing how Nancy Grace reached 
three million viewers the night Casey Anthony received her controversial acquittal). 
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Given the prevalence of legal commentators in the media and their 
unique role amongst other members of the media, legal commenta-
tors have become even more important. 
1. Role of Educating the Public 
The primary role of the legal commentator is to educate the 
public.50 The first sentence of the 2013 Standard’s section on legal 
commentators codifies this educational purpose, stating that, “[a] 
lawyer may serve an important role of educating the public regard-
ing the criminal justice system by providing legal commentary with 
respect to a criminal case.”51 As professionals trained in the law, 
attorneys can act as experts interpreting legal proceedings for both 
the public and the media by explaining to the public how the legal 
system works, the significance of evidence presented in a given 
case, and what legal arguments may exist for parties in litigation.52 
Legal commentators also help give the public perspective on the 
legal issues in a given case by recognizing and identifying what 
events are important and what events are not.53 As Professors Er-
win Chemerinsky and Laurie Levenson point out, “[o]ne of the 
greatest services a legal commentator can provide is to put the 
brakes on a story run amok and offer some perspective to a recent 
development in a case.”54 Skilled legal commentators both clarify 
aspects of the law and focus the public’s attention on the important 
details of a given case, thus enabling the public to evaluate the is-
sues themselves and reach well-informed conclusions. 
2. Enhanced Credibility of Legal Commentators to Journalists 
Legal commentators also differ from journalists due to the 
heightened credibility owed to attorneys and hired experts.55 The 
public is likely to take the statements of a legal commentator more 
seriously than those of non-attorneys because the media presents 
them as experts who are highly trained professionals with advanced 
                                                                                                                            
50 See Ethics I, supra note 4, at 1307–08; Witness to History, supra note 33, at 443. 
51 2013 Standards, supra note 4, § 8-2.4. 
52 See Laurie L. Levenson, Reporting the Rodney King Trial: The Role of Legal Experts, 27 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 649, 652 (1994). 
53 See Ethics I, supra note 4, at 1308. 
54 Id. 
55 See Levenson, supra note 52, at 663. 
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degrees.56 In addition, viewers may presume that attorneys who are 
also former prosecutors are even more trustworthy because viewers 
may impute the credibility of the government to the commenta-
tor.57 Once a prosecutor leaves his or her position and becomes a 
commentator, the commentator can capitalize on the reputation of 
the government by invoking his or her past experience.58 
For example, during the Duke lacrosse case Wendy Murphy, 
who was regularly introduced on MSNBC, FOX, and CBS news 
programs as a former prosecutor, referenced her experience as a 
prosecutor to bolster her credibility and support her own outlan-
dish statements, once stating, “I never, ever met a false rape claim, 
by the way. My own statistics speak to the truth.”59 As one former 
defendant in the Duke lacrosse case bluntly stated, “[w]hen Wen-
dy Murphy goes out and compares me to Hitler, she’s clearly out 
of her mind. But because they say she’s a former prosecutor, she 
gets credibility.”60 As this example shows, legal commentators can 
use their credibility to support extreme statements and make them 
appear more reliable to the public. 
                                                                                                                            
56 See id. (“When the term ‘expert’ is attached to a legal commentator, the public 
tends to give added credibility to that individual’s comments.”); see also Ethics I, supra 
note 4, at 1305 (finding that the media, in part, uses commentators because they enhance 
the credibility of their coverage). 
57 See TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 164 (discussing how the public can take 
even the most outrageous comments about defendants in a criminal trial seriously when a 
former prosecutor makes them); Abigail H. Lipman, Extrajudicial Comments and the 
Special Responsibilities of Prosecutors: Failings of the Model Rules in Today’s Media Age, 47 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1513, 1533 (2010) (finding that statements made by active prosecutors, 
“have increased likelihood to influence the public because the attorneys speak with ‘the 
inherent authority of the government’”). 
58 No DNA Match Found in Duke Rape Scandal, CNN (Apr. 10, 2006, 8:00 PM), 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0604/10/ng.01.html 
[http://perma.cc/D7HH-T7TJ] (providing an example of Wendy Murphy invoking her 
experience as a prosecutor to support one of her arguments). 
59 KC Johnson, The Wendy Murphy File, DURHAM-IN-WONDERLAND BLOG (Dec. 31, 
2006), http://durhamwonderland.blogspot.com/2006/12/wendy-murphy-file.html 
[http://perma.cc/F2KP-4VGC]. 
60 TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 165. 
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C. History of Regulation of Legal Commentators 
1. Mandatory Ethical Codes 
In 1887, Alabama adopted the first United States Legal Ethics 
Code, which encouraged lawyers to avoid speaking to newspapers 
unless strongly justified, stating that it is unprofessional to make 
statements anonymously.61 Then in 1908, the ABA published its 
first ethics code, The Canons of Professional Ethics, which 
adopted nearly identical language regarding statements to the me-
dia.62 In 1969, the ABA promulgated disciplinary rule DR 7-107 of 
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which imple-
mented far greater restrictions on what lawyers can say to the me-
dia.63 DR 7-107 stated that, “[a] lawyer . . . associated with a crimi-
nal matter . . . shall not . . . make or participate in making an extra-
judicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be dis-
seminated by means of public communication and that relates to” 
certain listed aspects of the case.64 Some courts have found DR-7-
107 to be unconstitutional.65 
In 1983, the ABA promulgated Rule 3.6 on trial publicity in the 
ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, establishing that a 
lawyer previously or currently participating in a litigation cannot 
make extrajudicial statements to the public that have “a substantial 
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding on 
the matter.”66 Comments to Rule 3.6’s also clarify that the rule 
only applies to lawyers participating in a proceeding because legal 
commentary is valuable, and further, the likelihood that commen-
tary from a lawyer not involved in the case will cause prejudice is 
small.67 
                                                                                                                            
61 Fleisch, supra note 1, at 600 (citing Peter R. Jarvis & Bradley F. Tellam, Lawyers and 
Trial Publicity—A Brief History of Regulation, 1995 PROF. LAW. SYMP. ISSUES 167 (1995)). 
62 Id. 
63 Id.; see also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
1980). 
64 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107; Fleisch, supra note 1, at 600–01. 
65 Fleisch, supra note 1, at 600–01 (citing Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 
1979); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 
427 U.S. 912 (1976)). 
66 Id. at 601; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2004). 
67 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.6. cmt. 
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In 1991, the Supreme Court addressed what constitutes a “sub-
stantial likelihood of material prejudice” as established by Rule 
3.6.68 In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,69 the Court considered an 
appeal by a lawyer whom the Nevada State Bar found had violated 
Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177, which is almost identical to Rule 
3.6.70 The Court did not decide Rule 3.6’s constitutionality, and 
only considered Rule 177 as it was interpreted and applied by the 
Supreme Court of Nevada. The Court held that the “substantial 
likelihood of material prejudice” standard contained in both Rule 
3.6 and Rule 177 does not violate the First Amendment rights of 
attorneys involved in a pending case.71 In addition, the Court de-
termined that limiting attorney speech when it will likely prejudice 
that attorney’s case, is narrowly tailored to protect a defendant’s 
right to a fair trial.72 Gentile upheld a narrow standard for regulating 
one type of lawyer speech, but did not indicate that broader regula-
tions of attorney speech would survive judicial scrutiny.73 Further, 
legal scholars have interpreted Gentile as holding that any mandato-
ry restriction on extrajudicial statements made by lawyers not en-
gaged in the representation of a party in a criminal proceeding to be 
unconstitutional.74 Following Gentile, no serious attempts have 
been made to create mandatory ethics rules for commentators.75 
Instead, legal scholars have advocated for the adoption of voluntary 
ethical standards.76 
                                                                                                                            
68 Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). 
69 Id. 
70 “Rule 177(1) prohibits an attorney from making ‘an extrajudicial statement that a 
reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if 
the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of 
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.’” Id. at 1033. 
71 Fleisch, supra note 1, at 601 (citing Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075). 
72 Id. 
73 See generally Gentile, 501 U.S. 1030. 
74 See Ethics I, supra note 4, at 1315–16 (distinguishing Gentile and finding that placing 
restrictions on commentator speech would violate the First Amendment for three main 
reasons: first, unlike in Gentile, commentators are not “officers of the court;” second, 
there is no evidence that regulating commentators speech is necessary to assure fair 
proceedings; and third, a mandatory ethics code would be unconstitutionally overbroad); 
Fleisch, supra note 1, at 607 (finding that an argument that restrictions on commentator 
speech could be narrowly tailored under Gentile and therefore constitutional is debatable). 
75 See generally Fleisch, supra note 1. 
76 See generally infra Part I.C.2. 
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2. Voluntary Ethical Standards 
With Gentile precluding judiciaries and bar associations from 
adopting mandatory ethical rules for legal commentators, the next 
option is for these organizations to adopt voluntary ethical codes or 
standards. Voluntary ethical standards avoid the constitutional 
questions presented by mandatory codes, as they are not govern-
ment-imposed restrictions on speech.77 Courts have also frequently 
and approvingly cited to voluntary standards in many cases.78 
While any commentator can choose to disregard voluntary stan-
dards, they present a number of potential benefits. First, voluntary 
standards put commentators on notice that they should take their 
ethical obligations seriously by publicly demonstrating how com-
mentators should act.79 Second, voluntary standards will help 
commentators navigate difficult ethical issues by providing a guide 
of best practices, while also providing clear examples of situations 
where a commentator is unqualified to provide legal commentary.80 
Third, voluntary standards can potentially give the public greater 
confidence in the work of commentators by showing the public that 
the legal profession considers commentary ethically important.81 
Fourth, voluntary standards provide commentators with support 
when they face pressure from the media to cross ethical lines by 
allowing commentators to fall back on explicit standards.82 
Legal scholars and organizations have presented several pro-
posals for voluntary ethical guidelines. First, in response to the 
numerous ethical abuses committed by legal commentators during 
the O.J. Simpson trial, law professors Erwin Chemerinsky and Lau-
rie Levenson proposed the creation of voluntary ethical guidelines 
                                                                                                                            
77 See Ethics I, supra note 4, at 1314 (contrasting voluntary ethical codes for 
commentators with government-imposed mandatory ethical codes, which “would surely 
violate the First Amendment since many provisions of an [mandatory] ethical code would 
concern the speech of the commentators”). 
78 Martin Marcus, The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards Forty Years of 
Excellence, 23-WTR CRIM. JUST. 10, 10–11 (2009) (finding that more than 120 Supreme 
Court cases and more than 700 federal circuit cases have cited to the ABA Criminal 
Justice Standards). “In 1986, Justice O’Connor, speaking for the Court, agreed that the 
Court ‘frequently finds [the ABA Standards] helpful.’” Id. at 11. 
79 See Ethics I, supra note 4, at 1312. 
80 See id. 
81 See id. 
82 See id. at 1313. 
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for legal commentators in a series of three law review articles pub-
lished in the mid-to-late 1990s (the “C&L Proposal”).83 Shortly 
thereafter, in 1998, the American College of Trial Lawyers pro-
posed a set of ethical guidelines for legal commentators (the 
“ACTL Proposal”) and the National Association of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers adopted ethical considerations for its members (the 
“NACDL Considerations”).84 Finally, in 2013 the ABA sup-
planted the ABA Criminal Justice Standards on Fair Trial and Free 
Press with the ABA Criminal Justice Standards on Fair Trial and 
Public Discourse and adopted Standard 8-2.4,85 which provided 
criminal justice ethical standards for statements made by legal 
commentators.86 Each of these proposals provided recommenda-
tions for best practices for legal commentators, including that legal 
commentators should be competent to provide commentary, avoid 
conflicts of interest, maintain confidentiality; avoid providing per-
sonal opinions; use their commentary to educate the public; and 
avoid materially prejudicing the fair administration of justice. 
a) Competence 
Each proposal states that a legal commentator should be com-
petent, emphasizing that commentators must know the law and 
                                                                                                                            
83 See Ethics I, supra note 4; Erwin Chemerinsky & Laurie Levenson, The Ethics of 
Being A Commentator II, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 913, 916 (1997) [hereinafter Ethics II]; 
Ethics III, supra note 32, at 738–39. 
84 Excerpt from Report on Fair Trial of High Profile Cases, 50 MERCER L. REV. 773, 774 
(1999) [hereinafter ACTL Proposal]; Ethical Considerations for Criminal Defense Attorneys 
Serving as Legal Commentators, 50 MERCER L. REV. 777 (1999) [hereinafter NACDL 
Considerations]. Both the ACTL Proposal and NACDL Considerations cite to 
Chemerinsky and Levenson’s work, with the NACDL stating that “[w]e owe a debt to 
Professors Chemerinsky and Levenson for their thought-provoking and thorough 
examination of issues involved in legal commentary and their suggestions for a proposed 
voluntary code for commentators generally.” NACDL Considerations, supra, at 777 n.2; 
see also ACTL Proposal, supra, at 774 n.2. 
85 2013 Standards, supra note 4, § 8-2.4. 
86 Id. The ABA has not yet provided commentary for these standards, but will likely 
adopt commentary in the future. See id.; Criminal Justice Standards, A.B.A., 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards.html 
[http://perma.cc/TSY6-9KTM] (last visited Sept. 25, 2015) (stating that after the ABA 
adopts new criminal standards, the ABA’s Standards Committee helps prepare and 
approves accompanying commentary). 
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facts of a matter in order to provide competent commentary.87 The 
C&L Proposal recommends that commentators have a duty of 
competence, requiring “substantive knowledge of the law, practical 
experience in the courtroom, familiarity with the proceedings at 
bar, and a willingness to do the research necessary to answer the 
many questions that arise in a case.”88 Similarly, the ACTL Pro-
posal requires that “[t]he commentator has an understanding of 
the background of the case so as to be competent.”89 Further, the 
NACDL Considerations’ duty of competence requires commenta-
tors to “know the legal and factual issues in a case” and also en-
courages media outlets seeking commentary to “gather as much 
relevant and reliable data regarding the case as possible to permit 
competent commentary.”90 
b) Avoiding Conflicts of Interest 
The C&L Proposal, ACTL Proposal, NACDL Considerations, 
and 2013 Standards each state that lawyers should avoid conflicts.91 
While a lawyer generally must avoid conflicts of interest with his or 
her clients, in the case of legal commentators the lawyer’s client is 
often considered to be the public.92 Some of the conflicts that 
commentators face include when commentators comment on pro-
ceedings that they have a personal stake in or when they represent 
a client or former client who may be affected by the proceeding.93 
The C&L Proposal lists seven types of conflicts, while the 2013 
Standards list three.94 Every proposal suggests that commentators 
                                                                                                                            
87 2013 Standards, supra note 4, § 8-2.4; NACDL Considerations, supra note 84, at 
778; ACTL Proposal, supra note 84, at 774. 
88 Fleisch, supra note 1, at 602 (quoting Ethics I, supra note 4, at 1320–21). 
89 ACTL Proposal, supra note 84, at 774. 
90 See NACDL Considerations, supra note 84, at 778. 
91 See 2013 Standards, supra note 4, § 8-2.4; Ethics I, supra note 4; NACDL, supra note 
84; ACTL Proposal, supra note 84. 
92 See Ethics I, supra note 4, at 1328. 
93 See Ethics III, supra note 32, at 745; ACTL Proposal, supra note 84, at 774. 
94 Fleisch, supra note 1, at 603 (citing Ethics III, supra note 32, at 745) (The seven 
conflicts are: “(1) conflicts created by a commentator’s personal relationship with a party 
in a case, (2) conflicts created by a commentator’s assistance to one party in a case, (3) 
conflicts created by a commentator’s stake in the outcome of a proceeding or a legal 
ruling, (4) conflicts created by a commentator’s political or organizational affiliations, (5) 
conflicts created by speaking to more than one media outlet, (6) conflicts created by 
contacting witnesses placed under gag orders or represented by counsel, and (7) conflicts 
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can at a minimum attempt to avoid conflicts by providing full dis-
closure.95 The C&L Proposal suggests that legal commentators 
provide full disclosure by doing, “everything in their power to en-
sure both the media and the public are aware of any potential con-
flicts.”96 The C&L Proposal recommends that legal commentators 
not only disclose potential conflicts to the media outlet they are 
contributing to, but also make disclosures directly to the public, 
because the media outlet may never convey the commentator’s 
disclosure to the public.97 
c) Confidentiality 
Only the C&L Proposal and 2013 Standards include recom-
mendations on preventing legal commentators from revealing con-
fidential information, and each proposal presents a different inter-
pretation of “confidentiality.”98 The C&L Proposal includes an 
expansive interpretation of confidentiality, suggesting that com-
mentators should keep confidential any statement made to them by 
a source when the commentator and source expressly promises to 
maintain confidentiality.99 The 2013 Standards have a more tradi-
tional approach to confidentiality, only recommending that a com-
mentator avoid revealing any information made confidential by the 
court, by the prosecutor, or by the lawyer’s duties of confidentiality 
or loyalty.100 
                                                                                                                            
created by directly or indirectly assisting the court.”); see also 2013 Standards, supra note 
4, § 8-2.4 (The three conflicts are: “(A) the representation of a client, past or present, 
who may be affected by the proceedings; (B) any relationships with the lawyers, judge, 
victim, witnesses or parties in the proceedings; and (C) the fact that the lawyer is being 
compensated for providing commentary, if that is the case, and the source of such 
compensation.”). 
95 See 2013 Standards, supra note 4, § 8-2.4; Ethics I, supra note 4; NACL, supra note 
84; ACTL Proposal, supra note 84. 
96 Ethics I, supra note 4, at 1329. 
97 See id. While this recommendation could theoretically ensure that the public is aware 
of all potential conflicts, commentators might avoid complying with it because making 
such a disclosure against an employer’s will would likely anger the employer and prevent 
the commentator from receiving further employment opportunities. 
98 See 2013 Standards, supra note 4, § 8-2.4; Ethics I, supra note 4, at 1325. 
99 Ethics I, supra note 4, at 1325. 
100 2013 Standards, supra note 4, § 8-2.4 (stating that a legal commentator “should not 
help provide information: (i) that is under seal; (ii) that was obtained in violation of a 
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d) Personal Opinions 
Each proposal cautions legal commentators against providing 
personal opinions or predictions for cases. The C&L Proposal em-
phasizes that a commentator should not make predictions, as pre-
dictions are often wrong and can cause unnecessary havoc, such as 
when predictions that the O.J. Simpson trial would result in a hung 
jury created fear in both the courtroom and in the public.101 The 
C&L Proposal also finds that a commentator should be careful 
when providing a personal opinion because commentators should 
always remain objective.102 The ACTL Proposal provides a more 
restrictive standard on personal opinions, recommending that 
commentators refrain from making any statements that include 
personal opinions or predictions.103 The NACDL Considerations 
suggest that commentators “exercise caution when asked to give 
an opinion about the quality of performance, strategy or tactics of 
another criminal defense lawyer.”104 Finally, the 2013 Standards 
provide a slightly more flexible standard that does not ban personal 
opinions outright, but suggests that a commentator exercise great 
caution before providing opinions, and further, specifically identify 
the basis for those opinions.105 
e) Educate the Public 
Each proposal, except for the ACTL Proposal, emphasizes that 
legal commentators have a distinct role in educating the public 
about a case and the legal system generally. The C&L Proposal 
states that the first role of the legal commentator is to educate the 
                                                                                                                            
protective order; (iii) that is grand jury information that has not been released; or (iv) the 
disclosure of which would violate the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality or loyalty”). 
101 See Ethics I, supra note 4, at 1309–10 (citing Paul Pringle, O.J. Mistrial? Retrial and 
Tribulation, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 20, 1995, at A1; Saundra Torry, TV Analysts 
Give Own Verdict: Deadlocked Simpson Jury, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1995, at 7). 
102 See Ethics I, supra note 4, at 1310. The authors originally recommended in Ethics I 
that legal commentators remain objective and neutral when providing commentary, but in 
Ethics III the authors change this requirement. See Ethics III, supra note 32, at 754. In 
Ethics III, they instead find that commentators can ethically act as advocates for 
particular sides of an argument, as long as the commentators clearly communicate to the 
media that they see themselves as partisan advocates. See id. 
103 ACTL Proposal, supra note 84, at 774. 
104 NACDL Considerations, supra note 84, at 779. 
105 2013 Standards, supra note 4, § 8-2.4(c). 
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public by not only reciting the law, but also by putting into perspec-
tive issues from the legal proceeding.106 The NACDL Considera-
tions impose upon members of the criminal defense bar a “special 
obligation to educate the public about what it means to be ‘liberty’s 
last champions’—our constitutional and ethical responsibilities as 
advocates for the accused.”107 The 2013 Standards state that com-
mentators have an important role in educating the public by en-
hancing their understanding of a criminal matter and the criminal 
justice system generally, and by promoting respect for the judicial 
system.108 
f) Not Materially Prejudicing the Fair Administration of 
Justice 
Finally, both the C&L Proposal and 2013 Standards emphasize 
that a lawyer’s commentary should not materially prejudice the fair 
administration of justice. Conversely, neither the ACTL Proposal 
nor NACDL Considerations contain such a duty.109 
II. THREE ISSUES NOT FULLY ADDRESSED BY ANY 
VOLUNTARY STANDARD 
The voluntary standards discussed above each aim to promote 
ethical practices for legal commentators speaking in the media. 
However, each of these standards leaves unresolved who qualifies 
as a legal commentator; what statements qualify as legal commen-
tary; and whether legal commentators should avoid providing 
                                                                                                                            
106 See Ethics I, supra note 4, at 1307–08 (finding that commentators can put events into 
perspective by differentiating between significant and trivial issues and viewing a case 
from both sides). 
107 NACDL Considerations, supra note 84, at 779. This obligation includes a “duty to 
ensure adherence to the presumption of innocence, insist that the government’s burden 
of proof in seeking conviction be met, foster respect for the system of trial by jury, and 
generally seek to improve the public’s understanding of and appreciation for the state and 
federal constitutional guarantees that protect persons accused of crime.” Id. 
108 2013 Standards, supra note 4, § 8-2.4. 
109 See generally NACDL Considerations, supra note 84; ACTL Proposal, supra note 84. 
The ACTL Proposal does caution that some commentators can “pose dangers to the 
public and to the administration of justice,” but does not explicitly encourage 
commentators to refrain from making statements that pose such risks. ACTL Proposal, 
supra note 84, at 774. 
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commentary that may cause unnecessary reputational harm to 
those involved in a criminal proceeding. 
A. Who Qualifies as a Legal Commentator 
While each of the ethical standards discussed above purport to 
apply to legal commentators, none of these standards explicitly de-
fines “legal commentator.”110 In Ethics I, Chemerinsky and Le-
venson addressed the issue of defining commentator, finding that 
“[t]here is no precise definition for ‘commentators’ . . . 
[f]unctionally, by ‘commentators,’ we are referring to lawyers and 
law professors who are speaking to the press about cases in which 
they are not a party, an attorney, or a witness.”111 The ACTL Pro-
posal does not state who qualifies as a commentator, but implicitly 
applies the proposal to lawyers “who appear on television or radio 
or address the media and opine on ongoing court proceedings.”112 
The NACDL Considerations do not define legal commentator, but 
present their standards as a way to address all lawyers’ “unique 
responsibilities when offering ‘expert’ legal commentary about le-
gal proceedings.”113 Finally, the 2013 Standards only state that, 
“[a] lawyer may serve an important role . . . by providing legal 
commentary with respect to a criminal case.114 
The C&L Proposal is the only standard that mentions lawyers 
who host legal talk shows, and none of the standards clarify wheth-
                                                                                                                            
110 Black’s Law Dictionary defines legal as “[o]f or relating to law; falling within the 
province of law” and does not have a contemporary definition of commentator. Legal, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (directing searches for a definition of 
“commentator” to “glossators” and “postglossators,” which are terms for Italian 
students of Roman law from the 11th–12th and 14th–15th centuries respectively). The 
Oxford English Dictionary has the same definition of legal and defines commentator as, 
inter alia, “[o]ne who gives commentary” or “[o]ne who reports or comments on current 
events, esp. on radio or Television.” 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 803 (2nd ed. 1989). 
111 See Ethics I, supra note 4, at 1316–17. Co-author Laurie Levenson previously stated 
in a footnote from an earlier article that, “[t]he term ‘legal commentator’ encompasses a 
wide number of roles ranging from answering questions for the news media, to appearing 
live on television, to explaining ongoing legal proceedings.” See Levenson, supra note 52, 
at 668 n.2. 
112 ACTL Proposal, supra note 84, at 774. 
113 NACDL Considerations, supra note 84, at 778. 
114 2013 Standards, supra note 4, § 8-2.4 (emphasis added). 
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er such “lawyer-hosts” constitute legal commentators.115 Cheme-
rinsky and Levenson recognized the importance of lawyer-hosts in 
improving the quality of legal commentary because, unlike other 
members of the media, lawyer-hosts have a greater understanding 
of what issues are important to a legal discussion and what issues 
are simply sensational and do nothing to enhance the public’s un-
derstanding of a legal matter.116 The professors found that the law-
yer-host has an essential role in directing a discussion and prevent-
ing commentators from taking control and gravitating towards 
purely sensational topics.117 However, the C&L Proposal never 
states whether lawyer-hosts constitute legal commentators covered 
by their proposed standards.118 
B. What Statements Qualify as Legal Commentary 
As stated above, the C&L Proposal, ACTL Proposal, and 
NACDL Considerations all apply their standards to legal commen-
tary on criminal proceedings.119 The 2013 Standards appear to only 
apply to commentator statements made regarding a “criminal 
case” or “criminal matter.”120 The 2013 Standards do not define 
criminal case, but do define a criminal matter121 as beginning after 
an individual “has been publicly identified as a subject of a criminal 
investigation, arrested, or named in criminal charges, whichever is 
earliest,” and ends “with a dismissal or verdict” unless there is “a 
                                                                                                                            
115 See Ethics III, supra note 32, at 756–57. See generally 2013 Standards, supra note 4, 
§ 8-2.4; NACDL Considerations, supra note 84; ACTL Proposal, supra note 84. 
116 See Ethics III, supra note 32, at 756–57. 
117 See id. 
118 See generally Ethics I, supra note 4; Ethics II, supra note 83; Ethics III, supra note 32. 
119 See supra text accompanying notes 72–74. 
120 See 2013 Standards, supra note 4, § 8-2.4. Examples of limits on Standard 8-2.4’s 
application are: “A lawyer may serve an important role . . . by providing legal commentary 
with respect to a criminal case,” “A lawyer may also legitimately provide consulting 
services . . . about a criminal case,” “A lawyer who is participating in a criminal matter 
should not undertake either of these roles—commentator or consultant—with respect to 
that criminal matter,” “A lawyer who is serving as a legal commentator should strive to 
ensure that the lawyer’s commentary enhances the public’s understanding of the criminal 
matter.” Id. (emphasis added). 
121 See id. § 8-1.2. For the purposes of this section, this Note considers a “criminal 
case” and a “criminal matter” as synonymous, although the ABA should clarify this 
point as well. 
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reasonable likelihood of a new trial.”122 While Standard 8-2.4 never 
explicitly states that it is limited to comments regarding a criminal 
matter, the standard’s scope is at best ambiguous.123 If Standard 8-
2.4 only applies to comments regarding a criminal matter, then it 
necessarily exempts legal commentary where no individual or enti-
ty has been identified as a subject of investigation, on criminal law 
generally, and on criminal matters after the court has reached a fi-
nal verdict. 
C. How Should Commentators Prevent Undue Reputational Harm 
The C&L Proposal, ACTL Proposal, and NACDL Considera-
tions do not address the potential for legal commentators to cause 
undue reputational harm to persons involved in a criminal case.124 
Instead, the 2013 Standards only address reputational harm caused 
by attorneys participating in a criminal matter.125 
III. VOLUNTARY STANDARDS SHOULD BROADLY APPLY 
TO ALL LAWYERS PROVIDING LEGAL ANALYSIS IN THE 
MEDIA AND ADDRESS COMMENTARY CAUSING UNDUE 
REPUTATIONAL HARM 
The 2013 Standards represent a significant step forward in the 
effort to encourage legal commentators to act ethically when mak-
ing statements in the media. However, any voluntary standard 
should broadly apply to all lawyers who provide legal analysis 
through the media, and to all statements that constitute legal analy-
sis. Furthermore, such standards should not be restricted to state-
                                                                                                                            
122 See id. 
123 See generally id. § 8-2.4. 
124 See generally Ethics I, supra note 4; Ethics II, supra note 83; Ethics III, supra note 32; 
NACDL Considerations, supra note 84; ACTL Proposal, supra note 84. 
125 See 2013 Standards, supra note 4, § 8-2.1 (stating that a lawyer participating in a 
criminal matter should not make extrajudicial statements “unnecessarily heightening 
public condemnation of a defendant or a person or entity who has been publicly identified 
in the context of a criminal investigation, or of a witness or victim”). The ABA has 
addressed reputational harm more directly in its ABA Standards for Criminal Justice on 
Prosecutorial Investigations, where the ABA directs prosecutors to consider harm to 
reputation when deciding to conduct an investigation or when selecting investigation 
techniques. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecutorial Investigations §§ 2.1–.2 
(2008). 
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ments made about ongoing criminal proceedings. Also, any volun-
tary standard must encourage legal commentators to avoid causing 
unnecessary reputational harm to persons involved in a criminal 
case. The ABA can begin to address these issues through its stan-
dards by clarifying aspects of Standard 8-2.4 and by adding lan-
guage to Standard 8-2.4 that encourages commentators to avoid 
causing undue reputational harm. 
A. Voluntary Standards Should Include a Comprehensive Definition 
of “Legal Commentator” 
Voluntary standards regulating legal commentators should in-
clude a definition of “legal commentator.” This definition should 
apply the standards to any lawyer that provides legal analysis to the 
media, either directly or through others, or provides legal analysis 
directly to the public. Before examining what a definition of legal 
commentator should entail, a primary inquiry must be made into 
when a lawyer qualifies as a legal commentator. Voluntary stan-
dards can distinguish between legal commentators and other law-
yers based on the medium a lawyer uses (e.g. television, radio, 
newspaper, blog, social media website, etc.), whether a lawyer is 
making statements in the media specifically as a lawyer or only as a 
journalist, or the content of the lawyer’s speech (e.g. only regulat-
ing lawyer statements regarding legal issues). 
When Chemerinsky and Levenson wrote their series of articles 
on legal commentators, they considered commentary provided on 
television, radio, and in newspapers.126 However, since the 1990s, 
the rise of the Internet has led to a great increase in available media 
outlets, including blogs,127 social networking websites128 such as 
                                                                                                                            
126 See Ethics I, supra note 4, at 1303–04. 
127 Blogs are “maintained websites with regular posted entries of commentary, news, or 
other topics.” Nicola A. Boothe-Perry, The “Friend”ly Lawyer: Professionalism and Ethical 
Considerations of the Use of Social Networking During Litigation, 24 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 127, 133 (2013). 
128 Social networking sites “allow individuals and organizations to connect virtually 
with others to communicate privately, share photographs and other digital media, and 
make public or semi-public announcements.” Michael E. Lackey Jr. & Joseph P. Minta, 
Lawyers and Social Media: The Legal Ethics of Tweeting, Facebooking and Blogging, 28 
TOURO L. REV. 149, 151–52 (2012). 
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Facebook and Twitter, and video-sharing sites such as YouTube.129 
With all of these different mediums for lawyers to reach the public, 
lawyers should be held to the same standard when making state-
ments in each forum. 
The overarching goal of Standard 8-2.4 is for legal commenta-
tors to educate the public and the standard encourages legal com-
mentators to “strive to ensure that the lawyer’s commentary en-
hances the public’s understanding of the criminal matter and of the 
criminal justice system generally, promotes respect for the judicial 
system, and does not materially prejudice the fair administration of 
justice, in the particular case or in general.”130 If a journalist is ask-
ing a lawyer to provide legal analysis, these goals are implicated re-
gardless of the way in which the public receives the commentary.131 
If a commentator’s statements are released to the public, the com-
mentator can potentially misinform the public, diminish the pub-
lic’s respect for the judicial system, or materially prejudice the fair 
administration of justice, regardless of whether the public watches, 
listens to, or reads the unethical statements. Furthermore, it 
should not matter whether this type of commentary reaches the 
public through traditional means or through the Internet (i.e. on-
line video, radio streaming, or written news on websites). 
In addition, the rise of the Internet has given lawyers a new 
ability to provide legal analysis directly to the public without going 
through a journalist, which further magnifies the issues addressed 
above. Lawyers publicly providing legal analysis on social media 
and blogs should also be held to ethical standards. Commentary 
provided on the Internet can potentially reach a large audience, 
with popular social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter 
having approximately 1.49 billion and 316 million monthly active 
users respectively.132 Further, there are approximately 3,500 legal 
                                                                                                                            
129 See id. 
130 See 2013 Standards, supra note 4, § 8-2.4(b). The author of this Note agrees with 
Standard 8.24’s goals and so recommends that any voluntary standard conform to them. 
131 Indeed, neither the C&L Proposal, ACTL Proposal, nor NACDL Considerations 
differentiate between the types of media that commentators use when making statements. 
See generally Ethics I, supra note 4; NACDL Considerations, supra note 84; ACTL 
Proposal, supra note 84. 
132 Company Info, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ [http://perma. 
cc/F48J-D8UG] (last visited Oct. 23, 2015) (reporting 1.49 billion monthly active users at 
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blogs on the Internet as of 2014 and the number of blogs will likely 
continue to grow significantly over the coming years.133 Therefore, 
due to the huge potential audience, an increasing number of law-
yers are using the Internet in an attempt to reach more and more 
people. 
In addition to creating a number of potential ethical issues for 
lawyers,134 use of social media by commentators can implicate the 
goals of Standard 8-2.4. Prolific legal commentators, including 
Nancy Grace and Dan Abrams, regularly use social media to reach 
thousands of people daily.135 When commentators comment on le-
gal issues, their words can have a great impact, even if the message 
is brief. For example, Grace started a controversy when she 
tweeted the hashtag “#VomitMom” to her followers when refer-
ring to a criminal case involving the drunk driving death of a moth-
er.136 Even this single phrase implicates the standards because it 
involves Grace sensationalizing a legal case and potentially impact-
ing a future jury pool by encouraging her audience to refer to the 
case by a derogatory nickname. With such large audiences, legal 
                                                                                                                            
the end of June 30, 2015); Company: About, TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/ 
company [http://perma.cc/4KYK-U3RF] (last visited Oct. 23, 2015) (reporting 316 
million monthly active users). 
133 Kevin O’Keefe, How Many Blogs Are There and Where Are We Headed?, LEXBLOG 
(Apr. 20, 2014), http://kevin.lexblog.com/2014/04/20/law-blogs-how-many-are-there/ 
[http://perma.cc/KY75-CX9G] (finding that the number of legal blogs should grow 
twenty-five to thirty percent per year). 
134 See generally Lackey & Minta, supra note 128, at 150 (discussing how use of social 
media can lead to potential ethical violations including violating a lawyer’s duty of 
confidentiality, legal advertising rules, and the prohibitions against unauthorized practice 
of law). 
135 Grace and Abrams’ Twitter accounts have tweeted more than 15,000 and 5,000 
messages respectively and have more than 450,000 and 66,000 followers respectively. 
Nancy Grace (@NancyGraceHLN), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/nancygracehln 
[http://perma.cc/4RUZ-GM4W] (last visited Oct. 23, 2015); Dan Abrams 
(@danabrams), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/danabrams [http://perma.cc/2R4J-
KEWL] (last visited Oct. 23, 2015). 
136 Jason Overholt, Nancy Grace Stirs Controversy with Posts About Mishawaka Mother’s 
Death, WSBT (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.wsbt.com/news/local/nancy-grace-stirs-
controversy-with-posts-about-mishawaka-mothers-death/26548178 
[http://perma.cc/ZN34-8ZCT] (discussing how Grace created the #VomitMom hashtag 
after a man was charged in the death of his wife, who died in a car accident when she 
placed her head outside of the passenger window to vomit while both she and the driver, 
her husband, were intoxicated). 
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commentators should be encouraged to act ethically when provid-
ing legal analysis on social media. Because of the increasing diversi-
ty and reach of different mediums, the ABA should not restrict the 
application of the 2013 Standards based on the medium a lawyer 
uses to provide legal analysis. 
The next consideration for the definition of legal commentator 
is whether the term should be limited only to commentators that 
explicitly rely on their legal expertise and experience as lawyers to 
comment on a legal issue, or whether it should apply to anyone 
with a law degree that comments on a legal issue.137 Voluntary 
standards should apply to any lawyer that provides legal analysis, 
but should exclude a lawyer who is only reporting on a case as a 
journalist (i.e. reporting the facts or issues of a criminal case with-
out analyzing its legal aspects). 
One type of lawyer that would qualify as a legal commentator 
under such a definition would be any lawyer that hosts a legal talk 
show.138 Each of the current voluntary standards are ambiguous as 
to whether they apply to “lawyer-hosts,” as distinguished from 
legal commentators.139 While the C&L Proposal correctly identifies 
the importance of lawyer-hosts, the proposal misses a very signifi-
cant issue: often the lawyer-host seeks sensational storylines and 
directs commentators to act unethically. When discussing Nancy 
Grace’s program, David Carr of the New York Times stated that 
“Ms. Grace races toward judgment, heedlessly ignoring nuance 
and evidence on her way to finding guilt,” as her experts have “all 
the independence of a crew of trained seals.”140 
                                                                                                                            
137 This section will not consider commentators who are asked to comment on legal 
issues specifically as legal experts or analysts. Lawyers that are interviewed as legal 
experts or analysts necessarily rely upon their role as a lawyer to provide commentary, so 
they should necessarily constitute legal commentators. 
138 The host of a legal talk show contrasts with the host of a news program not 
specializing in the law. For example, Chris Cuomo, a lawyer and journalist, hosts a show 
covering international events and breaking news. See About Chris, CHRIS CUOMO, 
http://chriscuomo.com/about-chris/ [http://perma.cc/QSS9-KBZ3] (last visited Sept. 
25, 2015). This definition of legal commentator would only apply to Cuomo if he 
discussed the legal aspects of a criminal case or issue, not if he was solely reporting on the 
case or issue as a journalist, without providing legal analysis. 
139 See 2013 Standards, supra note 4, § 8-2.4. 
140 Carr, supra note 48. 
2015] SENSATIONALISM FALLING THROUGH THE CRACKS 215 
 
One way lawyer-hosts act unethically, without providing com-
mentary themselves, is by eliciting inappropriate legal commentary 
from guest speakers. For example, in their book on the Duke la-
crosse case, legal commentator Stuart Taylor and history professor 
KC Johnson described how, in an episode of Nancy Grace, Grace 
had an exchange with a commentator and former prosecutor where 
she both made sensational statements and encouraged her guest to 
provide unethical comments.141 After stating that the defendants’ 
only defenses were “I didn’t do it,” “I did it, but it was consen-
sual,” and “[s]he’s a hooker,” Grace asked the former prosecutor 
about the discovery of the alleged victim’s false nails in the house 
of some of the defendants.142 After characterizing the alleged vic-
tim as beaten and battered, the commentator stated, “[a]nd based 
on the bruising and beating and the broken nails, Nancy, this is 
rape. If, in fact, there’s DNA, they can say consent all they want, 
but the other evidence speaks volumes, and it’s going to negate 
that.”143 Nancy Grace had already decided the defendants must be 
guilty, so she selected guests that would likely support this position 
and encouraged them to join her in condemning the defendants.144 
Later, on the same program, Grace interviewed a number of 
non-lawyer guests, including a neighbor of the defendants, a gradu-
ate student at Duke, and a clinical psychologist. First, Grace asked 
the neighbor if she recalled having any problems with the defen-
dants that lived nearby.145 The neighbor responded by accusing the 
students of “date rape” and “driving while intoxicated,” without 
any evidence.146 While Grace later stated, “[o]f course, those are 
allegations,” this single statement does not absolve her from the 
responsibility of eliciting inflammatory, unsubstantiated, and legal-
ly irrelevant commentary.147 She then brought on a Duke graduate 
                                                                                                                            
141 See TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 124; Jeffrey Rosen, Wrongly Accused, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 16, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/16/books/review/Rosen-
t.html [http://perma.cc/383M-CCZK]. 
142 See TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 124. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 123. 
145 Was Young Woman Assaulted by Duke Lacrosse Team?, CNN (Mar. 31, 2006, 8:00 
PM), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0603/31/ng.01.html [http://perma. 
cc/3EYF-K4MZ] [hereinafter Young Woman]. 
146 See TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 124. 
147 Young Woman, supra note 145. 
216 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXVI:189 
 
student, who said that there was “clear evidence of some sort of an 
assault having happened.”148 Finally, Grace spoke with a clinical 
psychologist who, as described by Taylor and Johnson, “at Grace’s 
invitation ridiculed a lacrosse team defender who cautioned against 
rushing to judgment and asked how viewers would feel if these 
were their own sons.”149 While voluntary standards cannot and 
should not apply to non-lawyers, in each of these examples Grace 
directly elicited commentary designed to sensationalize a criminal 
case by selecting guests she knew would make unethical comments. 
Voluntary standards should apply to a lawyer-host when he or she 
knowingly elicits unethical legal commentary from guests (lawyers 
or otherwise). Even if the host does not personally provide the un-
ethical commentary, voluntary standards should apply because 
lawyer-hosts should not be permitted to skirt ethics standards by 
using non-lawyer third parties. 
Many legal talk shows are formatted as debates between a law-
yer advocating for the prosecution and a lawyer advocating for the 
defense, which can encourage hosts to invite unqualified lawyers to 
comment on a case.150 For instance, after the prosecution’s case in 
the Duke lacrosse rape case fell apart, legal talk shows still needed 
advocates for the prosecution in order to maintain their debate 
format.151 Even Dan Abrams, who was often complimented by Tay-
lor and Johnson for his unbiased coverage of the case, brought 
guests on his show to defend views he knew to be “indefensi-
ble.”152 One such guest, Georgia Goslee, was wholly unqualified to 
provide commentary, as she had no criminal law experience, knew 
very little about the Duke case and even admitted that she was not 
familiar with North Carolina statutes.153 While Goslee’s comments 
on the case would have violated the 2013 Standards were they in 
place at the time, Abram’s decision to bring her on his show likely 
                                                                                                                            
148 See TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 124. 
149 Id. 
150 See TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 205 (describing how legal news television 
shows often use a debate format where two lawyers face off against each other and 
advocate for different sides of an argument, even when one side lacks serious merit). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
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would not be a violation of the ethics standards.154 Voluntary stan-
dards should not only hold unqualified commentators responsible 
for acting unethically, but should also admonish lawyer-hosts that 
invite unqualified commentators to act unethically. 
The ABA should add a definition of legal commentator that ap-
plies to any lawyer that provides legal analysis, either to the media 
or directly to the public, regardless of the medium the lawyer 
uses.155 Furthermore, this definition should include lawyer-hosts 
and apply to such hosts when they encourage their guests to pro-
vide unethical commentary, use non-lawyers to make unethical le-
gal statements, or recruit unqualified lawyers to provide commen-
tary. 
B. Voluntary Standards Should Apply To All Commentator 
Statements Made in the Media that Include Legal Analysis 
Another way that voluntary standards can better address the 
ethical concerns raised by lawyers speaking in the media is to apply 
ethical standards to all lawyer statements that include legal analy-
sis. Voluntary standards should encourage legal commentators to 
act ethically whenever they provide any legal analysis to the public, 
as opposed to only applying standards to statements made regard-
ing ongoing criminal proceedings as proposed by the C&L Propos-
al, ACTL Proposal, NACDL Considerations, and 2013 Standards. 
Furthermore, Standard 8-2.4 provides exemptions that contravene 
several of the standard’s overarching goals by permitting lawyers to 
provide unethical commentary in situations where such statements 
can cause harm to persons involved in a criminal case, the public, 
and the criminal justice system generally.156 
Standard 8-2.4 discusses several overarching goals that ethical 
commentators should promote, including educating the public re-
garding the criminal justice system; promoting respect for the judi-
                                                                                                                            
154 See 2013 Standards, supra note 4; TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 205. 
155 Standard 8-2.4 also applies to “consultants,” stating that “[a] lawyer may also 
legitimately provide consulting services to a newsgathering entity or individual about a 
criminal case.” 2013 Standards, supra note 4, § 8-2.4. However, this Note only considers 
lawyers acting as legal commentators and does not directly address lawyers acting as 
consultants. 
156 See id. §§ 8-2.4, 8-1.2(b). 
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cial system; and avoiding materially prejudicing the fair administra-
tion of justice.157 However, instead of promoting these goals, Stan-
dard 8-2.4’s current exemptions allow legal commentators to con-
travene each of the aforementioned overarching goals. 
First, Standard 8-2.4 excludes any legal commentary state-
ments made about a criminal investigation when authorities have 
not publicly identified a subject of the investigation.158 This exemp-
tion allows commentators to potentially misinform the public and 
materially prejudice the fair administration of justice by making 
statements that likely do not have a sufficient factual basis because 
the facts are underdeveloped at such an early stage of a criminal 
investigation. Unethical comments in situations where authorities 
have not publicly identified a subject can potentially mislead the 
public, harm the reputation of innocent people, and set back an in-
vestigation.159 Therefore, the ABA should apply Standard 8-2.4 to 
situations where authorities have not publicly identified a subject of 
a criminal investigation. 
Second, not applying Standard 8-2.4 to commentator state-
ments on criminal law generally has little impact on the fair admin-
istration of justice, but could affect the goals of educating the pub-
lic and promoting respect for the judicial system. While discussing 
an aspect of criminal law outside the context of an active criminal 
case would likely not affect an individual defendant’s trial rights, 
there is no justification for allowing the 2013 Standards to enable 
commentators to act unethically when speaking about criminal law 
generally. If a commentator is not competent to speak on a given 
issue, has undisclosed conflicts of interests, or has acted unethical-
ly in another manner proscribed by Standard 8-2.4, then the com-
mentator could cause harm to the public by spreading misinforma-
                                                                                                                            
157 See id. § 8-2.4. 
158 See 2013 Standards, supra note 4, § 8-1.2(b) (defining “criminal matter” as 
beginning only when an individual or entity has been publicly identified as a subject of a 
criminal investigation, arrested, or named in criminal charges). 
159 See Al Tompkins, Let’s Remember Richard Jewell as We Cover Boston “Suspects,” 
POYNTER (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.poynter.org/news/mediawire/210731/lets-
remember-richard-jewell-as-we-cover-boston-suspects/ [http://perma.cc/98LT-8GP3] 
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tion or hurting the public’s respect for the judicial system. The po-
tential for the aforementioned misbehavior justifies applying Stan-
dard 8-2.4 to statements made on criminal law generally, even if 
those statements do not affect the fair administration of justice for 
an individual defendant. 
Third, not applying Standard 8-2.4 when a court reaches a final 
verdict in a criminal case can cause great harm to the public and the 
judicial system. An example of this potential harm is the coverage 
of the Casey Anthony trial and the subsequent not guilty verdict. 
Casey Anthony was tried for the murder of her two-year-old 
daughter in a case that received large amounts of media coverage 
and became a national sensation.160 After Anthony was found not 
guilty, many people on talk shows and social media denounced the 
verdict and voiced outrage.161 Nancy Grace, who mockingly called 
Anthony “Tot Mom” during the proceedings, exclaimed after the 
verdict, “Tot Mom’s lies seem to have worked. The devil is danc-
ing tonight.”162 
Such unethical comments constitute commentary “designed to 
sensationalize a criminal matter” and can potentially misinform the 
public and hurt the public’s respect for the judicial system.163 In 
this instance, Grace seriously questioned the findings of a full jury 
trial and implied that the judicial system had failed by reaching a 
not guilty verdict. Many Americans voiced their displeasure with 
the result on social media, exemplifying that such statements from 
legal commentators can influence the public into believing that the 
criminal justice system has failed.164 Standard 8-2.4 should not al-
low commentators to mislead the public and hurt the standing of 
                                                                                                                            
160 See John Cloud, How the Casey Anthony Murder Case Became the Social-Media Trial of 
the Century, TIME (June 16, 2011), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/ 
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164 See id. (“These lawyers on TV during the Anthony trial only offered one side, 
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the judicial system through sensational statements simply because 
a defendant’s trial is over and the legal commentator disagrees with 
the jury’s verdict. As Standard 8-2.4 has several overarching goals 
beyond simply preventing commentators from making statements 
that materially prejudice the fair administration of justice, the ABA 
should not limit Standard 8-2.4’s scope to statements made prior 
to the end of a trial. 
An additional risk exists when Standard 8-2.4 does not apply to 
statements made about a case after the court has reached a verdict 
and there is no “reasonable likelihood of a new trial.”165 No “rea-
sonable likelihood of a new trial,” while somewhat ambiguous, 
clearly does not mean “no possibility of a new trial.” Therefore, 
harm can result when a commentator speaks unethically about a 
case in a situation where the defendant wins an unlikely appeal. An 
example of this situation is the case of Michael Skakel, who was 
convicted of murdering his 15-year-old neighbor Martha Moxley in 
1975.166 Skakel was sentenced to 20 years to life in 2002, with his 
conviction initially being upheld in 2006 after the U.S. Supreme 
Court declined to hear his appeal.167 However, a subsequent appeal 
for a new trial in 2013 based upon ineffective assistance of counsel 
succeeded, and Skakel is currently awaiting the outcome of a new 
trial.168 Prior to Skakel winning his appeal, he sued Nancy Grace 
and three others for libel, claiming that the comments made on 
Grace’s show contained a serious misstatement that could preju-
dice a future jury;169 Grace eventually settled the lawsuit.170 Ska-
                                                                                                                            
165 See 2013 Standards, supra note 4, § 8-1.2(b). 
166 Alison Leigh Cowan, At Issue in Skakel’s Libel Suit Against TV Host, Degrees of 
Tarnish on a Reputation, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/ 
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168 See id. 
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kel’s situation exemplifies the potential harm that exempting 
commentary on verdicts that have no “reasonable” likelihood of a 
new trial can cause by permitting unethical statements in situations 
where appeals are still possible. 
Voluntary standards should apply to all legal commentary, in-
cluding legal analysis. The ABA should clarify the scope of Stan-
dard 8-2.4 and ensure that it applies to any legal commentary pro-
vided by a commentator, regardless of whether the commentator is 
discussing a case without a suspect, a case that has reached a final 
verdict, or a facet of criminal law that is unrelated to any specific 
case. 
C. Voluntary Standards Should Address the Issues Created by 
Commentators Statements that Cause Unnecessary Reputational 
Harm 
Any voluntary standards should include language that encou-
rages lawyers to avoid making statements that have no legitimate 
educational purpose and will likely increase public condemnation 
or cause reputational harm to a person involved in a criminal case. 
Although some true statements will inevitably cause reputational 
harm, if such a statement also educates the public about a legal as-
pect of a case, the statement should not be discouraged because 
educating the public outweighs protecting an individual’s reputa-
tions. However, voluntary standards should reprimand commenta-
tors for making statements that unnecessarily damage a defendant 
or subject’s reputation when the statement has no countervailing 
educational benefit to the public. The 2013 Standards can and 
should discourage commentators from causing unnecessary reputa-
tional harm by adding new language that addresses this issue. 
A powerful example of the great harm that can occur from an 
unjustified attack on a defendant’s or subject’s reputation is the 
case of Tony Medrano. Tony Medrano was charged with man-
slaughter after she consumed nearly a fifth of vodka, fell asleep 
while sitting on a couch with her 3-week-old son, and accidentally 
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asphyxiated him.171 A day after the prosecution charged Medrano, 
Nancy Grace dubbed Medrano “Vodka Mom,” stating, “I don’t 
care if she was driving a car, holding a pistol or holding a fifth of 
vodka. [It] doesn’t matter to me. The baby is dead at the hands of 
the mommy.”172 According to family members, Medrano watched 
Grace’s show and burst into tears after hearing the statement. Soon 
thereafter, Medrano committed suicide and both her family and the 
police believed that Grace’s show potentially played a significant 
role in her decision to do so.173 
Outside of the fact that Grace’s statements would likely violate 
the 2013 Standards for sensationalizing the case and potentially 
prejudicing a future jury, her statements also caused great reputa-
tional harm with tragic consequences. Describing Medrano as 
“Vodka Mom” did nothing to educate the public on the relevant 
legal issues and was only meant to sensationalize the case and harm 
Medrano. The 2013 Standards should make clear that such unne-
cessary reputational attacks are unethical. 
Similarly, the Casey Anthony trial presents another example of 
unjustified reputational harm that occurred as the result of media 
coverage. Nancy Grace led the media’s fascination with Anthony 
as her “nightly attacks on the woman she scornfully referred to as 
‘Tot Mom’ almost single-handedly inflated the Anthony case from 
a routine local murder into a national obsession.”174 Members of 
the legal and journalistic communities explained that “some televi-
sion news shows built their ratings up by taking an openly prosecu-
torial stance against Anthony, leading to public expectations that a 
conviction was a slam-dunk certainty.”175 After Anthony’s not 
guilty verdict, many pundits and members of the public were out-
raged.176 During Nancy Grace’s live coverage of the verdict, many 
of the people interviewed outside the courthouse or on the phone 
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expressed dismay, including one woman who exclaimed, “[t]hat 
woman just got away with murder, Nancy.”177 
After the verdict, Anthony received numerous death threats 
and was even described as “one of the most hated women in Amer-
ica” by the Florida Department of Corrections, which decided not 
to publicly disclose her parolee information in order to protect her 
safety.178 The constant attacks and pro-prosecutor slant of many 
legal talk shows convinced America that Anthony was guilty and 
completely ruined her reputation.179 Without a countervailing edu-
cational purpose, such attacks only cause harm and should there-
fore be strongly discouraged. Any voluntary standards, including 
Standard 8-2.4, should urge commentators to refrain from making 
statements that have no legitimate educational purpose, a substan-
tial likelihood of damaging a defendant’s or subject’s reputation, or 
causing increased public condemnation. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the ABA’s adoption of voluntary ethical standards for 
legal commentators, commentators such as Nancy Grace and 
Wendy Davis likely will not change their practices. Nevertheless, 
Standard 8-2.4 provides general guidance for legal commentators 
and encourages them to act ethically, which will hopefully have a 
positive impact on the legal news field. The ABA’s current stan-
dards do an admirable job of supporting commentary that educates 
the public, promotes respect for the judicial system, and avoids ma-
terially prejudicing the fair administration of justice.180 However, at 
this point, no voluntary ethical standard clearly states: who quali-
fies as a legal commentator; what statements qualify as legal com-
mentary; or addresses the potential harm that can occur to a per-
                                                                                                                            
177 David Bauder, Anthony Lawyers Blast Cable News After Acquittal, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(July 6, 2011), http://news.yahoo.com/anthony-lawyers-blast-cable-news-acquittal-23223 
3047.html [http://perma.cc/D26N-WF4E]. 
178 Jessica Hopper, Casey Anthony Called “One of the Most Hated Women in America” By 
Probation, ABC NEWS (Aug. 25, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/casey_anthony_trial/ 
casey-anthony-called-hated-women-america/story?id=14377966 [http://perma.cc/8239-
PGXY]. 
179 See supra text accompanying notes 174–78. 
180 See 2013 Standards, supra note 4, § 8-2.4(b). 
224 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXVI:189 
 
son’s reputation from commentary that has no educational pur-
pose. 
The ABA’s 2013 Standards can address these concerns by mak-
ing three significant changes to the 2013 Standards. First, the ABA 
should draft a broad definition of legal commentator that applies to 
any lawyer providing legal analysis to the public, including lawyers 
hosting legal talk shows. Next, the ABA should ensure that the 
2013 Standards apply equally to all legal commentator statements 
that provide legal analysis, regardless of whether the commentator 
is discussing a case without a suspect, analyzing a case that has 
reached a final verdict, or is focusing on criminal law in a general 
sense. Lastly, the ABA should draft language that encourages 
commentators to refrain from making statements with no legiti-
mate educational purpose that have a substantial likelihood of ei-
ther damaging the reputation of a person involved in a criminal 
proceeding or causing increased public condemnation. By explor-
ing these issues further, and drafting new language that clarifies 
and broadens Standard 8-2.4’s scope, the ABA can increase the 
potential impact of its standards. As the 2013 Standards are only 
intended to provide a guide to best practices, and are not mandato-
ry, the ABA should draft these standards liberally and ensure that 
Standard 8-2.4 reaches the widest audience possible.181 
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